



Directorate of  
Intelligence

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# Afghanistan Situation Report

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28 January 1986

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
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**AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT**



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
**REGIME PRESENCE IN HERAT**



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The government may have more administrative offices in Herat than previously believed, but these offices probably keep a low profile due to heavy resistance activity.



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
**CRACKDOWN ON INSURGENT SYMPATHIZERS**



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regime arrests of military and government personnel suspected of aiding the resistance.



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**IN BRIEF**

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**PERSPECTIVE**

**MASOOD AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE PANJSHER**



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
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Masood has developed an effective civilian support network in the Panjsher, which assists him in obtaining money, supplies, and information.



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**REGIME PRESENCE IN HERAT**

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Recent reporting from the US Embassy in Kabul indicates that government administrative activity in Herat may be greater than many Western observers previously thought.

[redacted] at least six ministries and two government banks have offices there. [redacted]

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
**Comment:** The resistance has long been active in and around Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city, and the regime's administrative units there probably function at a low level. As recently as last July combined Soviet-Afghan forces launched operations around the city aimed

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
at denying the resistance a base of operations from which to launch attacks in the city, on the western pipeline, and against Soviet convoys, but the operation failed to achieve its objectives. 

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**CRACKDOWN ON INSURGENT SYMPATHIZERS**



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
**Comment:**  a growing body of evidence that widespread arrests of high-ranking military officers occurred in the past few months. Several general officers in the Ministry of Defense were reportedly arrested recently in Kabul for coup-plotting and espionage. Although widespread sympathy for the insurgents within the government and the military continues to frustrate efforts by the regime to consolidate power, 

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


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
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**PERSPECTIVE****MASOOD AND THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE PANJSHER**  
by **NESA**

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The civilian population remaining around the Panjsher Valley contributes to insurgent effectiveness by paying taxes, aiding insurgent resupply efforts, building military facilities, and providing intelligence. Civilians also present Masood with problems, however; to maintain their support he must provide protection, financial support, and attempt to convince them not to blame the guerrillas for the brutal Soviet retaliation that often follows insurgent attacks. As one of a new breed of commanders, he also takes special pains to cultivate civilian support by running an effective local administration, emphasizing Islam, and separating guerrilla bases from civilian areas. In our view, all of these measures, and his military prowess, account for his widespread popular support.

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**Civilian Support to Masood's Operations**

**Financial Support.** Although the Jamiat-i-Islami Organization in Peshawar and various private western support organizations provide a significant portion of Masood's income, some Panjsher civilians also contribute to Masood's war chest.

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\* the civilian population in the Panjsher now numbers about 20,000 compared to 90-100,000 prior to the Soviet invasion.

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Kabul traders also provide financial support to Masood. Since the people of Kabul depend on the Salang Road being open for Soviet supplies, Masood has agreed not to interdict all traffic travelling to Kabul and to limit his attacks to military convoys, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] In return, Kabul merchants provide Masood with funds and information, [REDACTED]

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**Transportation and Logistics.** Civilians in the Panjsher Valley also make an important contribution to the resistance by transporting arms and supplies from Pakistan. Horses are the primary pack animals in the insurgent logistics system and a majority of families in the Valley provide at least one horse to ferry arms from Pakistan, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The Panjsher insurgents need more horses than are now available and actively encourage civilians to raise or buy horses. [REDACTED]

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**Food.** Panjsher Valley food production also contributes to the insurgent cause. The Andarab Valley--where Soviet and Afghan forces are strong--also is a source of food to the insurgents of the Panjsher Valley, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Food production in the Panjsher Valley in 1984 was almost nonexistent, but output of wheat and corn was up sharply in 1985. Food supplies from the Andarab Valley will still be needed, but the plentiful harvest in the Panjsher Valley should provide the insurgents with a good reserve of food stocks and a more varied diet. [REDACTED]

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**Other Benefits.** The presence of civilians and insurgent families has a positive effect on insurgent morale in the Panjsher Valley. Civilians also provide intelligence and serve as laborers to build shelters and other facilities at newly-established bases in the Andarab side valleys, [REDACTED]

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### Maintaining Civilian Support

Masood wants to prevent the remaining civilians from becoming refugees in Pakistan. [REDACTED]


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[REDACTED] he pays 5,000 Afghanis (US \$40 at bazaar exchange rate) per month per family plus 200 Afghanis per child to civilians deprived of a livelihood


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by the fighting. Each family is also provided with a ration card by the local mountain base that entitles it to food and money when available. Insurgents also dispense Western-supplied humanitarian aid to Panjsher civilians, 

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 Masood recognizes the need to build popular support for the military struggle. He does this in part by using Islam as a political vehicle, attempting to protect civilians from retaliation, and by using effective officials in his local administration. His civilian government, for example, is in the hands of the Muslim clerics and the courts are staffed with graduates of Kabul University's Law School. His efforts to professionalize the insurgent struggle by creating guerrilla bases away from the civilian population, moreover, are largely aimed at shielding civilians from Soviet reprisals. 

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### Outlook

We believe the civilians who now inhabit the Panjsher Valley are committed to Masood and the resistance. If the Soviets decide to step up indiscriminate retaliation against Panjsher civilians or launch another offensive, Masood may again order the civilians to leave the valley temporarily for their own protection, as he did prior to the 1984 Soviet offensive. This would initially reduce insurgent effectiveness, but would not prevent Masood from launching operations in the Panjsher Valley and in the surrounding areas. 

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